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COUNCIL AND COMMISSION
EIGHTEENTH REPORT
ON 1HE ACTIVITIES OF THE M 0 NET AR Y COMMITTEE
FOREWORD
The purpose of this report is to give a brief account of the activities of the Monetary
Committee in the ,course of 1976.
During the year, the Committee held 13 sessions and the working parties drawn from its
own members or set up at its initiative met on many occasions.
At its session of 30 January it. elected its officers. It elected as chairman Mr K. O. Pohl
Secretary of State in the Federal Finance Ministry, Bonn, and, as Vice-Chairmen, Mr J.
Haberer, Ministry of Finance, Paris, Mr S. Palumbo, Ministry of the Treasury, Rome and,
while awaiting a Council Decision creating a thirq,vice-chairman, provisionally elected Mr
S. Andersen, joint-Governor of Danmarks Nationalbank to this post. This was confirmed at
its meeting of 31 March. The terms of office of the new officers will expire on 31 December
1977. A list of members as at 31 December 1976 is annexed.
The report was adopted as at 31 December 1976.
INTRODUCTION
1. In 1976, the world economy saw marked progress,
with production and trade showing growth rates similar
to those obtaining before the oil crisis. This favourable
development was not, however, a return to the status
quo. Balance of payments disequilibria continued to re-
flect the aftermath of the quadrupling of oil prices. The
external deficit of the non-oil producing developing
countries was reduced somewhat, but there was a sharp
deterioration in the external position of the indus-
trialized countries as a whole, which moved back into
deficit, and the surplus of the OPEC countries was even
higher than in 1975.
2. For the Community, 1976 marked an upturn out of
the recession. The growth of output, very high in the
first half of the year, but more moderate later, was not
however accompanied by any reduction in unemploy-
ment, because of the size of spare productive capacity.
and the increase in wage costs. The average rate of in-
flation diminished, although the differences from one
country to another remained large. On the other hand,
the Community s current account showed a sizeable de-
ficit, particularly due to a worsening in the current ac-
count position of some countries which were already in
deficit. In these conditions, divergences in the exchange
rates of Community currencies were further accen-
tuated. The activities of the Committee were concen-
trated on analysing these features and on trying to con-
ceive of methods to cushion the effects of those prob-
lems on Community affairs. Moreover the Committee
constructively worked on solutions to monetary ques-
tions in a worldwide context.No C 195/2 Official Journal of the European Communities 15. 8. 77
COMMUNITY ACTION AND THE ACI1VITIES OF THE COMMITTEE
3. In 1976, the Committee devoted a large part of its
time to examinations of the economic situations of
Member States, paying particular attention to monetary
policy measures used in response to the overall
economic situation. During the year all Community
countries were examined at least ,once, and some of
them much more frequently. These more frequent 'ex-
aminations were either undertaken in conformity with
the provisions governing the use of Community credit
mechanisms or as a consequence of the non-participa-
tion of Member States in the financing of intra-Com-
munity assistance.
4. One of the countries whose economy was examined
by the Committee on numerous occasions was Italy. At
the beginning of the year, the  ad hoc  working party
chaired by Mr de la Geniere prepared a report to the
Committee on the economic situation in Italy and the
economic policy conditions which could be attached to
a Community loan to that country. The Committee
adopted that report at its February meeting and submit-
ted an opinion to the Council and the Commission (An-
nex I). This opinion was taken into account when the
Council adopted a Decision on 15 March 1976 fixing
the economic policy conditions to be observed by Italy.
In November, the de la Geniere group delivered a new
report on the Italian economy which was approved by
the Committee and submitted to the Commission in De-
cember 1976. The Italian lira came under renewed pres-
sure in late April and May, and the Italian Government
requested the Commission authorization to take
emergency measures under Article 108 of the EEC Trea-
ty. The Monetary Committee was consuJted on this oc-
casion, and again on 2 October when the Italian au-
thorities decided to introduce a temporary (for 15 days)
tax on purchases of foreign currency and on 26 October
when this tax was re-introduced although at a lower
rat~, along with a whole series of other measures aimed
at stabilizing the Italian economy. The Committee con-
tinued to monitor the Italian situation ona permanent
basis right through the year.
5. The Committee twice examined the situation in the
United Kingdom, as required by that country s non-par-
ticipation in the provision of medium-term financial as-
sistance for Italy. The Committee, aided by the work of
the  ad hoc  working party chaired by Mr Andersen, ag-
reed that the United Kingdom s non-participation was
justified by its balance of payments and reserves posi-
tions.
6. During autumn, the pound sterling came under se-
vere pressure on the exchange markets. and at its meet-
ings in September and December, the Committee held
an examination of the economic situation in the United
Kingdom and of the economic and monetary policy
measures being taken to meet this situation. The Com-
mittee, during its deliberations, kept itself informed ab-
out financial assistance made available to the UK by
other international organizations.
7. The working .party maired by Mr Andersen also
met in December to prepare a report on the economic
situation ' in Ireland and the extent to which the
economic policy conditions for 1976 in connection with
the Community loan to that country had been met. The
Committee took note of the progress made and esti-
mated that a basis for further progress in 1977 had been
established.
8. In response to the communication 'Economic and
Monetary Policy Measures' presented by the Commis-
sion to the European Council on 1 and 2 April, and to
the suggestions put forward by the Netherlands Presi-
dent of the Council for strengthening the economic ami
financial cohesion of the Community, the Committee
devoted a number of meetings to examining three as-
pects of monetary problems which presented themselves
to the Community. These were the Community s ex-
change rate arrangements, the fixing of quantitative
monetary policy objectives, and control of the Euro-cur-
rehcy markets. At the end of its discussions it adopted a
report, which was submitted to the Council and the
Commission (Annex II).
(a) Discussion on the Community s exchange rate ar-
rangements was based on proposals made by the
Netherlands members. Account was also taken 
proposals made by the French memqers in 1975.
The objective of both sets of proposals was to aim at
a more coordinated and less divergent system of ex-
change rates in the Community. The Dutch propos-
als reflected a desire for a better cooperation be-
tween snake countries and those countries whose
currencies float independently without recreating
exchange rate rigidities. The essence of these pro-
posals was to provide a framework for discussion
within the Community on exchange rate policies
and related measures by introducing a system of so-
called target zones expressed in effective exchange
rates. The Committee concluded that the introduc-
tion of a coherent system to cover all Member States
along the lines suggested. would not be feasible at
present, given the wide divergences in the trends of
the economies of the Member States as well as dif-
ferences of opinion on various aspects of the pro-
posed scheme. However, the Committee proposed to
the Council that it continue its discussions on the
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under what circumstances the proposals could be
implemented and the Committee will report back to
the Council in early 1977.
(b) Discussion on the fixing of quantitative monetary
policy objectives was based on an initial exchange of
views on the experiences of Member States in using
this kind of instrument, and on a preliminary report
prepared by the Working Party on Harmonization
of Monetary Policy Instruments (Annex III). The
Committee concluded that internally established
monetary objectives which vary from one Member
State to another should be discussed from time to
time in the Committee, which should compare the
outturn with the objectives, examine and account
for any deviations and discuss possible remedies.
The theoretical and technical studies of ways and
means of gradually aligning intermediate objectives
without encroaching upon national powers and
areas of responsibility is being pursued in the work- ing party. 
(c) The examination of ways of controlling the Euro-
currency markets' was prepared by the Working
Party on Short-term Capital Movements, which
submitted a report to the Committee on 'The Euro~
currency markets and the regulation of international
financial flows' (Annex IV). The Committee was
sceptical of the practical possibility of introducing
control of the Euro-currency markets by monetary
policy means, and concluded that only steps aimed
at improving transparency of these markets could be
undertaken at present. It supported efforts being
made in various fora to improve the available in-
formation on countries' indebtedness and to resolve
the problems involved in a greater degree of col-
laboration between national risks bureaux.
9. In March, the Council took a decision to raise a
Community Loan in favour of Italy and Ireland. This
loan, upon which the Committee was consulted; for a
total amount of $ 1100 million and DM 500 million
was made up of four parts. Firstly, a fixed-interest, six-
year bond issue of $ 300 million, a fixed-interest
seven-year bond issue of DM 500 million, a fixed-rate
four-year private placement of notes of $ 500 million,
and a five-year floating rate bank loan of $ 300 million.
Later in the year, it was considered opportune and use-
ful to consolidate a part of the floating-rate bank loan
into a medium-term fixed interest loan. The Committee
was consulted on this proposal at various stages of the
negotiations, and on the filing of the registration state-
ment with the SEC following the assignment of a triple
A rating to the Community. This operation was success-
fully concluded in October with the floating of a $ 100
million five-year note issue on the New York market.
10. As .usual, the Committee discussed international
monetary problems on a number of occasions, including
the finalizing of the revision of the IMF Articles of
Agreement, and problems arising out of the sale of gold by
the IMF, with a view to arriving at a common position
of Community countries. In addition, it monitored the
work of the fourth commission (finance) of the Confer-
ence on. International" Economic Cooperation. The
Committee was also instrumental in arriving at com-
mon positions of Member States for the annual meet-
ings of the World- Bank and International Monetary
Fund at Manila in October.
11. The Committee also examined various other mat-
ters, the main ones being foreign exchange market prac-
tices and regulations in Member States, proposals to
change the conversion rates for national currencies into
units of account for the purposes of the Common Agri-
cultural Policy, and monetary compensatory amounts
within the Common Agricultural Policy.
WORKING PARTIES OF THE MONETARY COMMITTEE
12. The Working Party on Securities Markets met four
times in 1976, and continued to examine developments
in the capital markets of the Member States and in the
international bond markets and also discussed capital
market policies. In view of the growing tendency for is-
suers to use variable rate techniques for raising loans in
a period of monetary erosion and instability of interest
rates, the working party decided to undertake a study of
the different formulae used for issuing floating rate
notes on the international market, and the implications
of this method for the future of the national fixed-in-
terest bond markets as a means of raising long-term
capital. This work has begun and will be continued in
1977. In addition, the working party also held an ex-
change of information on accounting procedures and
tax treatment of transactions in securities.
13. The Working Party on Harmonization of Mon-
etary Policy Instruments, a joint group of the Committee
and the Committee of Governo~s, met several times in
1976. In June, it submitted an interim report (Annex III)
to the two Committees who examined it and, on this
occasion, confirmed the direction in which the working
party proposed to orient its work. As a result, the work-
ing party then commenced a new serie~ of studies of
simulation exercises with monetary policy instruments
arid analyses of the transmission process of monetary
policy.No C 195/4 Official Journal of the European Communities 15. 8. 77
14. Following the revised terms of reference given to it
by the Committee and the Committee of Governors in
1975, the joint Working Party on Short-term Capital
Movements continued its work on the 'Euro-currency
markets and the regulation of international financial
flows . It submitted a report on this matter to the two
parent Committees in June (Annex IV) and this report
formed the basis for the Committee s discussions and
subsequent report on this topic (see paragraph 8 (c)
above).
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ANNEX I
REPORT TO 1HE COUNCIL AND THE COMMISSION ON THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN
ITALY AND THE ECONOMIC POLICY CONDITIONS WHICH COULD BE A TIACHED TO A
COMMUNI1Y LOAN
Introduction
1. At its meeting of 16 February 1976, the Council.authorized
the opening of the negotiations necessary for a Community
Loan operation in favour of Italy. Council Regulation (EEC)
No 397175 concerning Community loans, lays down (Articles
3 and 8) that the Council, acting on a proposal from the
Commission, which consults the Monetary Committee on the
matter, shall decide the economic policy conditions to be fulfil-
led by the beneficiary Member State in order to redress its bal-
ance of payments.
2. In accordance with this Regulation, on 27 February 1976
the Committe held an examination of the economic situation
in Italy, prepared by an  ad  hocwoiking party chaired by Mr
de la Geniere, First Deputy-Governor of the Banque de France.
The Monetary Committee s conclusions on this matter are
summarized in this report, which revises and up-dates that
which the Monetary Committee prepared on 28 November
1975 (11/858/75) in the framework of the medium-term
financial assistance granted to. Italy by Council Directive
74/637 IEEe.
Economic situation in Italy
. 3. The .Italian economy was hit by the recession in 1975. The
main economic indicators show, however, that the trend pat-
tern varied during the year: the recession steadily deepened in
the first three quarters but a turning point was reached in the
fourth, when signs of a recovery appeared. Compared with the
same periods last year, the unadjusted index of industrial pro-
duction fell 11.9% in the first quarter, 12.2% in the second,
12.3% in the third and 2.5% in the fourth, a drop of 9.8% for
the year as a whole. As a result, the gross domestic product in
terms of volume for 1975 was some 3.4% below the 1974
level.
4. The downturn in production in 1975 led to a progressive
deterioration in the employment situation and an increase in
unemployment, on an annual comparison of 0.5% in the first
quarter, 37.8% in the second, 17,6% in the third, and 15.6%
in the fourth (source: 1ST AT). It should be added that these
figures do not tell the full story, since they do not take account
of short-time working, whether or not 'compensated' by the
Cassa Integrazione (the number of hours covered by payments
from this body increased three-fold between 1974 and 1975).
5. The rate of price increases slowed down somewhat in 1975.
Thus, compared with the previous quarter, wholesale prices,
after rising 0.4% in the first quarter, increased only 0.1 % in
the second quarter but 0.9% in the third quarter and 2.4% in
the fourth. The rise in consumer prices, after reaching 3'6% in
the first quarter of 1975 and 2,7% in the second quarter, was
1.9% in the third quarter and 3.0% in the fourth (still com-
pared with the previous quarters). A further increase of
1.1% was recorded in January 1976. For 1975, the rise in
wholesale prices averaged 8.5% and that in consumer prices
17.0%.
Although the rate of increase (year-on-year) lost momentum
the trend in recent months remains a source of concern.
These price rises were accompanied by a sharp increase in
wages and salaries. During the year, hourly wages rose by
27%, representing an increase in real wages and salaries and
hence a considerable extra burden for firms whose profit mar-
gins had already considerably narrowed.
6. The balance of payments improved in 1975: the overall
deficit narrowed to Lit 1 129 000 million (as against Lit
3 588 000 million in 1974) and so roughly matched the drop
in official reserves (Lit 1 239000 million). On the basis of
foreign currency statistics, the deficit on the trade balance (cif-
fob) was Lit 2520000 million (as against Lit 6481000
million in 1974), and the balance of service transactions and
transfers showed a surplus of Lit 1 079 000 million (Lit
607000 million in 1974), giving a deficit on current account
of Lit 1 368 000 million (Lit 5 830 000 million in 1974).
The most striking feature of this development was the recovery
of the trade balance, which is all the more remarkable since it
took place in a period of contraction in the volume of inter-
national trade. Imports fell 5.7% in terms of value in
January-December and 14% in terms of volume in January-
November 1975, compared with the corresponding periods in
1974. By contrast, exports during the same periods increased
15.6oio  in terms of value and 1.7% in terms of volume (all on a
trade statistics basis). These figures, however, indicate the pre-
carious nature of the recovery as it is shown to be primarily
due to the fall in imports following the contraction in domestic
demand: it should be noted that a third of the trade deficit 
1975 was recorded in the fourth quarter, when the recovery
got under way.
The economic policy pursued in 1975 and observance of the
economic policy conditions laid down for the grant of
medium-term financial assistance to Italy
(Articles 6 and 7 of Council Directive 74/637/EEC of
17 December 1974)
7. From the beginning of 1974, the authorities, faced with the
stagnation of domestic demand, had eased the restrictive
nature of monetary policy; the depth of the recession in 197515. 8. 77 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 195/7
prompted them to adopt a monetary policy aimed at assisting
the recovery of domestic demand. This policy resulted in a sig-
nificant fall in interest rates, a return to a ' normal' st\'Ucture of
rates and, at the same time, a revival on the financial market.
Together with a sharp expansion in the Treasury s borrowing
requirement, it caused the ceilings fixed' in connection with the
grant of medium-term financial assistance to be considerably
exceeded.
8. The growth in total lending will probably exceed the ceiling
of Lit 24 700 000 million fixed for the period from 1 April
1975 to 31 March 1976 (Article 6 of Directive 74/637/EEC
mentiol1ed above) by about Lit 5 000 000 million, as the
Treasury deficit is likely to be much higher than expected.
otallending has been running ahead of this ceiling since Oc-
tober 1975; until then, the intermediary objectives had been
observed.
The ceilings on public finances fixed in Article 6 of the Direc-
tive were, likewise, very substantially exceeded: the rate of in-
crease in central government expenditure was of the order of
23% in 1975 instead of the 16% laid down, and the deficit on
Treasury transactions exceeded the figure of Lit 8 000 000
million by about Lit 5 400 000 million. It should, however, be
noted that, while in 1974 three-quarters of the Treasury deficit
had been financed by recourse to the Banca d'ltalia, in 1975
only about 40% of it was financed in this way.
Outlook for 1976 and the economic policy conditions to be
observed by the Italian authorities
9. According to macro-economic forecasts prepared by the
Italian experts, the growth of GDP in 1976 could well amount
to 1 to 2 % in real terms. These forecasts assume a growth of
6% in the volume of world trade, with Italian exports main-
taining their relative share. The expected rate would be based
on a 2 to 3 % increase in private consumption and a continua-
tion, although at a slower pace, of the decline in 'investment
(affecting primarily plant and machinery). There will probably
be a further increase in unemRlqyment over and above the high
level reached at the end of 1975. Prices, measured in terms of
the GDP deflator, will probably rise by 16%. Finally, the pay-
ments deficit on current account is likely to be of the order of
Lit 500 000 to Lit 1 000 000 million.
Recent economic developments in Italy have thus highlighted
the fragile aspects of the economy. Budgetary measures
designed to stimulate demand, coupled with an easy monetary
policy, have led to a certain upturn in activity but also to a de-
terioration in the balance of payments and to the risk of a
quickening in the pace of inflation.
10. Given these macro-economic forecasts, the Committee
has, together with the Italian authorities, reviewed the
economic policy conditions laid down in Council Directive
75/784/t:EC .of 18 December 1975 adapting the conditions
laid down for the grant of medium-term financial assistance to
Italy. It has been found that the recent deterioration in Italy
internal and external situation would, if no corrective measures
were taken, cause the ceilings fixed in that Directive to be once
again considerably exceeded in 1976. Under these circum-
stances, the Italian authorities could, in connection with the
grant of a Community loan, contemplate taking measures to 
ensure compliance with these conditions, some of which could
even be tightened.
11. Directive 75/784/EEC provided that the growth of total
lending in 1976 would be limited to Lit 31 000 000 million.
The Italian authorities could lower this ceiling to Lit
30 000 000 million, necessitating a contraction in the public
sector borrowing requirement and, at the same time, a reduc-
tion in the growth rate of the private sector s financial assets
which recently triggered flights of capital out of the country. In
these circumstances, the rate of growth of. money supply in
1976 will beat a similar level to previous years (about 18%).
12. Directive 751784/EEG had limited the rate of increase in .
central government current expenditure to 15% in 1976. The
present forecasts of current expenditure suggest that the rate
laid down will be exceeded. The Italian authorities have pro-
posed that it be replaced by a cash ceiling on total expenditure;
so as to curb expenditure, they could accept a ceiling of Lit
40 000 000 million, which is slightly lower than the forecast of
Lit 40 600 000 million in the Monetary Committee
November report (doc. 11/858/75). The rate of growth of total
expenditure will thus stabilize in 1976 at about 25%, the same
as in 1975:
. 13. The deficit on Treasury transactions had been  limited to
Lit 14800000 million in 1976. The Italian authorities feel
that this ceiling could be lowered to Lit 14 300 000 million.
The main emphasis would. have to be on cutting or postponing
certain items of expenditure, but, to achieve the objective laid
down, it would also be necessary to increase the tax burden.
14. By contrast, the Italian authorities have pointed out that
the ceiling of Lit 5 700 000 million fixed for central bank
financing of the deficit on Treasury transactions cannot be
lowered and might even be exceeded. .
15. Finally, it should be noted that Italy s application for a
Community loan of around $. 1 000 million comes at a time
when a deficit on the current balance of up to Lit 1 000 000
million ($ 1 200 million) is forecast. In addition, there is the
need to take into account debt maturities totalling $ 2 300
million (about Lit 1 800000 million) in 1976.
16. The Committee has noted the economic policy measures
taken by the Italian authorities on.25 February 1976 to reduce
internal liquidity. The Committee has also noted the adjust-
ments envisaged by the Italian authorities to the economic
. policy targets for 1976 fixed by the Community, to take into
account recent developments in the Italian economy. While
appreciating the efforts that will have to be made by the Italian
aUthorities to respect the revised targets, the Committee em-No C 195/8 Official Journal of the European Communities 15. 8. 77
phasizes that the restoration of internal and external equilib-
rium necessarily implies a significant reduction in the rate of
monetary expansion which last year exceeded nominal gr~Wth
of GNP hy 5.9 percentage points (nominal GNP groWth
15,6' 1.. M2 groWth 21'S'Yo). A significant reduction in the
Treasury deficit would facilitate the achievement of this objec-
tive. Moreover, the target for Treasury financing by the Cen-
tral Bank is excessive and should be further reduced.
Outside the strictly monetary and financial sphere; the Com-
IJ1~ttee suggests that an essential element for the re-establish-
ment of equilibrium in the Italian economy is a moderation in
the tate of increase' of nominal incomes. Monetary and
budgetary policy cannot by itself moderate in a satisfactory
manner pressures which are incompatibk with growth of out-
put in real terms. 
Finally, the Committee recongized that, in accordance , with
their specific declarations, the Italian authorities will not take
any measures. of a financial or commercial nature to restrict
imports or subsidize exports. In this context, the' Committee
recognizes that, given the Italian balance of payments prospects,
the proposed tommunity Loan operation is opportune.
ANNEX 
REPORT TO THE COUNCIL AND TO THE COMMISSION
1. In a communication entitled 'Economic and Monetary
Policy Measures' the Commission presented certain proposi-
tions to the European Council on 1 and 2 April 1976. At the
Council meeting (Economic and Financial Affairs) held in July
1976, the Netherlands President put forward certain sugges-
tions for strengthening the economic and financial cohesion of
the Community. It was these tWo events w~ichled the Commit-
tee to examine three aspects of the present currency problems
which are very closely interlinked and of great importance to
the Community, namely, the Community exchange rate ar-
rangements, the fixing of quantitative monetary policy objec-
tives and control of the Euro-currency markets.
In accordance with the Council's request of 26 July 1976, the
Committee now submits a summary of its fincJings.
Community exchange rate arrangements
2. A working paper presented by' the Netherlands Members
served as basis for discussion of this topic. Al;count was also
taken of proposals made by the French delegation in 1975, The
Committee noted that the tWo sets of proposals are motivated
by the same considerations. Both:
are based on the belief that the present situation is unsatis-
factory;
reflect a desire for a better cooperation betWeen snake
countries and those whose currencies float independently
without recreating rigidities to the detriment of currencies
which are currently outside the snake;
are based on the recognition of the fact that exchange rate
developments of all Community currencies should be
subject to some kind of Community coordination.
3. The essence of the Netherlands Members' proposals is:
(a) to provide a framework for discussion within the Com-
munity on exchange rate policies and related measures (in
particular monetary policy, intervention and exchange con-
trols) with the aim of coordinating the various policy aspects; 
(b) to avert the threat of a politically undesirable division be-
tWeen those Member States which take part in the Euro-
pean snake arrangement and those which do not. Snake
members have clear obligations towards each other which
make coordination of policy a necessity. Member countries
which do not participate in the snake arrangement do not
have the same obligations in respect of exchange rate
policies as snake members;
(c) to create certain flexible guidelines which could contribute
to improving the coordination of 'economic policies. These
guidelines might include:
(i) fixing of non-binding 'target zones' in terms of effective
exchange rates either for the floating currencies alone
or for all Community currencies. These target 'zones
will initially serve only as a trigger for consultation on
the Community level, when market rates move outside
the target zone;
(ii) negative intervention and monetary policy obligations
(no obligation to keep the exchange rate within the
target zone, but the commitment to refrain from policy
measures which would push the exchange rate out of
that zone in a downward direction);
(Hi) possibly, in a later stage, the obligation to direct
monetary policy at preventing a depreciation below the
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4. The Committee welcomed the determination of the present
members of the 'snake' to maintain their participation in it and
noted that this was in itself a measure of the success of
economic policy coordination in these countries.
The Committee also recognized that in circumstances in which
there were large differences in domestic rates of inflation both
within the CommunitY and outside, a system of floating rates
had to a certain extent played a stabilizing role and had helped
to avoid the adoption of undesirable trade restrictions. How-
ever, it expressed concern about excessive fluctuations in ex-
change rates and pointed to the danger that these might spread
their effects to other currencies, thus increasing the general in-
stability and even creating the risk of retaliatory protectionist
measures.
5. The Committee is of the opinion that a higher degree of ex-
change tate stability in the Community would be desirable, but
that its achievement presupposes stability of underlying
economic conditions as well as close convergence in the trend
of the economies of the Member States, which is directly de-
pendent on the effective coordination of general economic
policy. The coordination of monetary and credit policies is par-
ticularly important in this conIlection owing to their direct im-
pact on capital flows (see the second part of this report). How-
ever, while stressing the key role of coordination, the Commit-
tee recognized that even with closely coordinated policies, the
economic development in the various countries could still di-
verge.
6. The Committee acknowledged that the system of target
zones offers flexibility as the operating rules can be made 
binding as desired. Moreover, there are several alternative
ways of defining the target zones and their size. The Nether-
lands approach would allow the present snake machinery and
rules to be retained, with wider and less binding target zones
being established for countries with independently floating cur-
rencies and possibly also for snake currencies taken as a group.
This means the approach does not imply a weakening of disci-
pline in the snake mechanism, and does not require the coun-
tries with independently floating curren~ies to accept binding
obligations to intervene in the exchange markets.
7. Opinion in the Committee was divided on the question of
whether target zones should be established only for indepen-
dently floating currencies to the exclusion of snake currencies,
taken as a group or individually.
Those in favour of target zones for the independently floating
currencies only are afraid that the obligations entailed in the
fixing of target zones for snake currencies might conflict with
snake rules. They stress the fact that the snake is meant to
serve as an instrument under which the Member States ex-
change ratepolicie$  vis-a-vis  each other are governed by pre-
cise rules, but externally it is intended to constitute a joint
float. By definition, this excludes the Community from main-
taining the currencies of non-member countries at given levels
on the exchanges.
Those opposed felt that separate treatment for snake and non-
snake currencies constituted an undesirable distinction.
Member States participating in the snake should pursue a
policy cowdinated at Community level  vis-a-vis  other Com-
munity currencies and the currencies of the rest of the world,
in particular the US dollar. Only in this way could an asym-
metrical pattern between the burdens and duties of both
groups of countries be avoided.
It was further argued that, both because of the dollar s general
importance as a vehicle and reserve currency and because of its
different weight in member countries' external transactions, it
will be difficult to achieve a reasonable degree of stability be-
tween snake and non-snake member currencies (and even to
avoid tensions within the snake) without concerted endeavours
to keep exchange rate movements between the snake and the
dollar within reasonable bounds.
8. Some members suggested that there would be a case for al-
lowing countries with independently floating currencies in cer-
tain circumstances and in consultation with countries affected
to intervene in snake currencies. The Committee noted that the
Committee of Governors is studying the question and it may
consider the matter further when the Governors' conclusions
are available.
9. Opinion was divided over the scale of lending facilities 
some automatic, others ,less so  at present available in the
Community. Some members felt that it was essential to estab-
lish adequate machinery for Community credit as without this
the task of organizing exchange arrangements in the Commu-
nity would be impossible. Other members argued that suffi-
cient credit facilities already existed within the Community and
through the International Monetary Fund, and that the provi-
sion of new drawing facilities might have inflationary implica-
tions. 'The Committee noted however , that countries with in-
dependently floating currencies, are always able to draw on the
existing short- and medium-term credit facilities of the Com-
munity if they comply with their rules and conditions. It was
'Suggested that, in o~der to reinforce the process of cotlvergence
of economic policies, the credit mechanisms of the Community
should be made instrumental to that end. This could 
achieved by partitioning the credits available to a country in
tranches and imposing stricter conditions for drawings in
higher tranches. Both the adequacy and the conditionality of
credit will be studied further.
10. The Committee agreed that, at present, given the wide
divergences in the trends of the economies of Member States,
particularly inflation rates, as ~ell as differences of opinion on
various aspects of the proposed scheme, it would not be fea-
sible to introduce a coherent system along the lines suggested.
However, the Committee expressed its willingness to continue
its discussion of these proposals, which are part of a more
comprehensive package aiming at convergence of economic
policies in the Community. They should be studied further
both as proposals for Community action and in the framework
of the preparation of discussions in the International Monetary
Fund on this subject.No C 195/10 Official journal of the European Communities 15.
II. Fixing of quantitative monetary objectives
11. In its Communication to the European Council of 1 and 2
April 1976, the Commission emphasized the need for better
. coordination of economic policy for the Community. Since
monetary policy has an appreciable impact on growth, the
value of money and employment, the coordination of mon-
etary policy in the Community is an essential component of the
coordination of economic policies. Its aim must be the re-es-
tablishment and maintenance of stability in the countries of the
Community. It is also one of the preconditions for greater sta-
bility in exchange rate relationships between the member coun-
tries (see paragraph 5). Stability is not a goal in itself, but the
key condition that must be fulfilled if full employment and
balanced economic growth are to be ensured.
12. The Committee agreed that coordination of economic and
monetary policies with a view to stabilization is not only
necessary for the maintenance of the European exchange rate
system (the 'snake ) but is also indispensable if European in-
tegration is to make progress.
13. When discussing the scope for coordination of monetary
policy, the Committee began by considering what have so far.
been the intermediate objectives of monetary policy' at national
level, and reviewed experience gained. This discussion showed
that there has been a trend in recent years towards heavier em-
phasis on money supply objectives. One Member State has
established and published monetary targets for the past two
years while two Member States have established similar targetS
for the first time this year. However, both the national defini-
tions of money supply and also the degree to which quantita-
tive targets are regarded as binding still vary substantially from
country to country.
At present, the money supply is treated .as a dominant inter-
mediate monetary objective in four countries and as an ancil-
lary intermediate objective in two other countries. In only two
countries is the money supply disregarded altOgether as an in-
termediate objective.
In some member countries global credit is the main inter-
mediate monetary objective; though here again definitions vary
from country to country. Interest rates, bank liquidity and the
monetary base are also used as intermediate monetary objec-
tives.
14. The differences in the choices made by the various gov-
ernments of intermediate objectives are mainly a matter of the
varying importance and weight of the following factors:
(i) relative importance enjoyed by monetary policy in the
overall framework of economic and financial policy;
(ii) size of and method of financing the public-sector deficit;
(iii) structure. of the national financial markets;
(iv) economic impact of, and relations with, the rest of the
world;
(v) theoretical approach adopted and credit policies pursued
by the relevant central bank.
15. The Committee members agree that a reduction in the dif-
ferences between the intermediate objectives would be useful in
itself, because these differences would have an increasingly dis-
ruptive effect the more progress is made tOwards economic and
monetary union. They are aware of the danger that too hasty
an alignment of intermediate monetary objectives might fail to
take sufficient account of the structural differences between the
Member States and could therefore limit the effectiveness of
monetary policy.
The basis for coordinating monetary policy must, in the first
instance, be the intermediate objectives tested at national level;
subsequently, efforts could be made to reduce gradually the
differences. It should also be remembered that any improve-
ment in monetary policy cooperation depends essentially on
the political will of those concerned.
16. At present, a majority of Member States are prepared, not
only to attach more importance to management of money sup-
ply, but also to establish quantitative intermediate monetary
objectives and to use them as benchmarks for their own policy;
there is also a broad measure of recognition by the members of
the Committee of the great importance for those involved in
the economic activity of publishing monetary and/or credit
guidelines. Admittedly, these objectives range from general no-
tions about medium-term monetary trends to fairly binding
quantitative objectives. It must also be remembered that the
scope available to the central banks for influencing the
economy is by no means unlimited and that some room must
also be left for revising monetary policy objectives given the
complexity of actual economic activity and ,the multiple and
sometimes conflicting objectives of economic policy.
Those Member States whose economies are particularly de-
pendent on external factors take a more cautious approach to
the idea of fixing quantitative intermediate monetary objectives
which would be binding, their main concern being their need
to be able to react flexibly to exchange rate fluctuations.
17. The Committee considers that it would be appropriate to
make pragmatic use of any opportunity of aligning monetary
policy objectives without encroaching upon national powers
and areas of responsibility.
The Committee therefore concluded that internally established
national monetary objectives which vary from one Member
State to another should be discussed from time to time in the
Committee, which should compare the outturn with the objec-
tives, examine and account for any deviations and discuss pos-
sible remedies. The theoretical and technical studies of ways
and means of gradually aligning intermediate objectives should
be pursued. 
Ill. Control of the Euro-currency markets
18. On the basis of a report submitted by the Working Party
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studied the problems involved in controlling the Euro-markets.
The BIS was represented at the Committee s discussion.
19. Improvements in arrangements for prudential supervision
have been made in recent years to shield the Euro-markets
from critical developments. The authorities have strengthened
protective _measures at both national and international level.
The Euro-banks, too, ~ave generally become more cautious in
their business policy. fIo'Yev , there.is a latent danger of dis-
turbances occurring in view of the amount and mobility of
Euro-funds and the constantly developing and changing
general situation.
20. The Committee has conducted an exchange of views on
the possibility of improving control over the potentially
disturbing effect of the Euro-marketson monetary and ex-
change rate policy by joint credit policy measures (e.g. by in-
troducing minimum reserve requirements on foreign currency
assets or liabilities in all member countries of the EEC). Differ-
ent views emerged on the usefulness and practicability of such
controls and also on whether or not the Euro-markets are a
source of liquidity creation.
21. Some members are of the opinion that the Euro-markets
only act as an intermediary between national money and capi-
tal markets without creating money to any significant degree.
In the view of some other members, the Euro-markets are
capable of creating money autonomously, increase global cre-
dit supply and can become an additional " source of inflation
when uncontrolled developments occur. 
22. The way in which the usefulness of joint measures is
judged depends on the different views referred to in paragraph
21 above. It depends also on differences between national ex-
change control practices. Several members consider that capital
flows through the Euro-markets are no different in their
monetary and exchange rate effects from any other interna-
tional capital flows and that it is possible and practicable for
individual countries to isolate themselves against disturbing in-
fluences associated with international capital flows by means
of suitable national controls (restrictions on capital transac-
tions). Some of them therefore see no need for joint manage-
ment of the Euro-markets by credit policy measures. Some
other members whose countries apply capital' restrictions
howev~r, stress the national inability to ward off massive in-
flows from the Euro-markets, especially in times of monetary
upheaval. They, therefore, are in favour of joint measures to
curb the expansion of the Euro-markets, Finally, joint mea-
sures are of particular interest to those countries that resort to
capital controls only in extreme cases. In circumstances where
capital transactions are in principle free of direct controls the
national market is always exposed to influences originating in
the Euro-markets. This also applies under flexible exchange
rates which can cushion disturbances originating in the Euro-
markets, but cannot ward them off completely.
23. There are also differences of view regarding the feasibility
of effective monetary controls over the Euro-markets. If joint
management by means of credit policy measures is conducted
in a limited region, there is a danger  which will increase
with the severity of the measures adopted  of an acceleration
. of the tendency which already exists for Euro-market business
to shift to are~s where no control can be exercised and in
which banking supervision is perhaps carried out with less
stringency. In the opinion of some members, the effect of joint
measures would thus be thwarted. These members consider
that it would hardly be possible to get agreement on joint con-
trol measures over a wider area encompassing major financial
centres outside the Community. Other members see little
danger of business shifting its location. In their view, any shifts
would be within narrow limits owing to the established stru ture of banking. 
24. During discussions within the Monetary Commitee, ' a
number of members pointed out that management of the sup-
ply of funds through Euro-banks in a regulated area by means
of credit policy measures would. need to be complemented by
restrictions on the demand for capital in the Euro-markets by
non-bank residents of the area (perhaps by means of a cash
deposit) in order for it to be effective. This would prevent
non-bank residents of the regulated area from going to banks
outside the area when taking up loans. However, it was also
pointed out that such a combination of measures cannot be
considered a permanent solution but only a temporary one
when critical monetary developments occur.
25. Given the present differences in assessing the role of die
Euro-markets, progress towards a coordinated or common ac-
tion would, in the view of the Committee, presuppose that a
political consensus to this effect be achieved and manifest itself
within the EEC Council. Some members emphasized their view
that, if the Community is to become a zone of monetary stabil-
ity, a more active and coordinated Euro-market policy is neces-
sary.
26. Under these circumstan~es, the Committee is" of the opin-
ion that only steps aimed at improving the transparency of the
Euro-markets can be undertaken at present. The Committee
therefore welcomes the work recently initiated by the central
banks of the member countries of the EEC and the other mem-
bers of the Group of Ten and Switzerland to improve the in-
formation available on countries' indebtedness. Transparency
in this area is still not complete. The reporting procedure
should cover as large a number of countries as possible, includ-
ing the major financial centres outside the Community.
27. In addition, the Committee notes that efforts are being
made by the Commission, in its Working Party for Coordinat-
ing Banking legislation, to resolve the problems associated
with the possible establishment of a system of collaboration
between national risks bureaux of Member States on indi-
vidual large loans.No C 195/12 Official Journal of the European C~mmunities 15. 8. 77
ANNEX III
INTERIM REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON HARMONIZA nON
OF MONETARY POLICY INSTRUMENTS
Introduction
In the first stage of its work, the expert group has focused on
intermediate objectives of monetary policy. These constitUte, in
its opinion, an important reference point for the coordination
of monetary policy in the Community (see points 1 and 2, of
the mandate) and a study of them should logically precede the
examination of instruments.
Thus Chapter I of this report gives an account of the inter-
. .
mediate objectives chosen in each member country while
Chapter II presents a comparative analysis of them and sets out
the reasons for differences between the intermediate objectives
which are set.
In Chapter III the group develops some preliminary ideas on
the problem of the harmonization of intermediate objectives,
while emphasizing that its scope should become more clearly
defined as the work of the group proceeds.
I. Intermediate objectives in the different member states
1. In  Germany,  the intermediate objectives of monetary policy
are the monetary aggregates, that is the money stock in its var-
ious definitions, but above all central bank p:1oney (notes in
circulation plus compulsory reserves on banks' domestic liabi-
lities, calculated at constant reserve ratios).
On the other hand, the level of interest rates is not an objective
in itself and interest rate policy has only an instrumental
character. The success of monetary policy is not measured by
the level which interest rates reach but by the achievement of a
desired monetary expansion.
For 1975 the Bundesbank announced for the first time an in-
termediate objective in the form of a quantified rate of growth
of central bank money. For 1976 this objective has been for-
mulated as a rate of growth of, on average, 8% over the previ-
ous year.
2. In the  Netherlands,  also, monetary policy seeks to influence
monetary aggregates. The resulting levels of interest rates are
accepted unless the policy is jeopardized by external con-
straints. The most important intermediate objective is the level ,
of the ratio between the liquidity of the economy (M2 accord-
ing to the national definition) and nominal net national pro-
duct. In relating the stock of M2 to nominal income, account
may be taken of the scope for changes in velocity of circula-
tion, which in conjuncti~n with the rate of M2 creation pro-
vides the basis for the appraisal of the monetary situation and
prospects. Bank credit, or more generally domestic M2 crea-
tion, serves as an important complementary intermediate ob-
jective. While total M2 creation affects the level of demand
and thereby the current account of the balance of payments,
the domestic component of M2 creation not only affects the
size of M2 itself, but also to an important degree determines
the relative shares of domestic and external sources in M2 cre-
ation through its direct and indirect influences (recourse to
foreign lending and interest rate effects) on the capital account
of the balance of payments.
3. In  France,  the objective of the monetary authorities is to
adapt the actual Qr probable future amount of money in cir-
culation to the value of production and trade. As there is no 
accurate way of recording and analysing monetary flows in the
economy, the central bank tends to refer to representative
aggregates that are easy to obtain. Thus the most widely ac-
cepted intermediate monetary objective is the growth of the
money supply (M2 is taken as the best indicator), defined in re-
lation to the projected trend of GNP.
To fix this objective, the authorities assume a certain degree of
stability in the ratio of money supply to GNP, but allowance is
made for changes that may occur in the attitude of economic
agents towards the holding of cash balances and liquid assets.
To attain the desired rate of growth of the money supply, the
authorities seek to control all sources of money creation. By far
the most important source is still cr~dit to the economy (i. e.
bank lending to companies, households and local authorities)
and in periods of restrictive monetary policy specific limits are
set on its expansion.
4. In  Belgium,  the intermediate objectives of the monetary au-
thorities are global credit to the corporate and household sec-
tors and the level of interest rates.
Since de-specialization has reached, a very advanced stage
among financial intermediaries and there is a high degree of
substitution among the various forms of' financial asset,
monetary aggregates of any kind undergo distortions which
considerably reduce their validity as intermediate objectives. In
formulating their intermediate objectives, monetary authorities
use analytical forecasts of the financial deficits and surpluses of
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5. In  Denmark loans extended to the private sector by finan-
cial institutions, especially banks, are the main intermediate
objective. There has, however, been a tendency to favour a
wider concept, namely the overall expansion of credit from
either domestic or foreign sources.
After a long period of surplus, the budget has recently moved
into deficit and the monetary authorities have therefore been
led to pay greater attention to the growth of the money supply.
Interest rates playa more limited role as external constraints
call for an adequate margin between domestic and foreign in-
terest rates, especially in the short-term range.
6. In  Italy,  the major intermediate objectives are credit to the
private and public sectors (credit granted by banks and
specialized credit institutions, and global credit), monetary
base (in particular, the total reserves of the banking system)
and interest rates.
The money supply is regarded as less significant than it is in
, other countries, because there is a high degree of substitution
between money and other financial assets, which is rendered
greater by the fact that banks are able to pay very high interest
rates on current~account deposits.
To provide a formal framework for the choice of intermediate
objectives, the Italian monetary authorities make forecasts of
financial accounts, on the basis of which an overall compari-
son can be made of the financing capacity and financing re-
quirements of the different sectors and forecasts of financial
flows consistent with these aggregates can be formulated.
7. In the  United Kingdom,  the formulation of intermediate ob-
jectives is carried out against the background of overall fore-
casts for the real economy and for financial flows. Those fore-
casts  amended to reflect any policy measures that are
adopted in response to them  constitute an accepted com-
promise between final objectives that may be in conflict: objec-
tives for the level of domestic economic activity, for the state of
the external balance on both current and capital transactions
and for price stability. The forecasts also produce projections
for various monetary aggregates - Ml, M3, DCE (Domestic
Credit Expansion) and bank credit to the private sector  and
for the pattern of interest rates, which are judged to be mutu-
ally consistent and may therefore be included in the category of
intermediate objectives. - 
None of these intermediate, objectives is 'normative' in the
sense that a departure from forecast would promptly lead to
policy action to restore it. 'The policy response to departures
from forecast depends on an evaluation of many factors: the
instability and uncertainty of the relationships between' real
and financial variables, and even between different financial
variables, may allow some of the latter to depart from their
projected levels without invalidating the forecast as a whole.
Greater weight would normally be attached to a major aggre-
gate, such as M3, than to one of its individual counterparts
such as bank lending to the private sector. The emphasis
placed on different intermediate objectives shifts over time as
the goals of overall economic management change and the role
given to monetary policy in economic management varies.
8. In  Ireland,  monetary policy is based on the existence of a
reasonably stable relatiOnship between monetary aggregates
and national income. The intermediate objectives are, first, the
money supply and, secondly, bank credit. 
The growth rate of money supply is fixed in the light of fore-
casts of national income in value terms. The intermediate ob-
jective for credit (credit granted by banks  including the cen-
tral bank  to the private and public sectors) is calculated by
subtracting the expected increase in external monetary reserves
from the projected growth in the money supply.
Interest rates in Ireland cannot differ appreciably from those in
the United Kingdom without provoking heavy capital move-
ments, because of the close monetary ties between these coun-
tries.
II. Comparison of intermed,ate objectives within
the Community
9.  Monetary aggregates  (money stock and central bank
money) are treated as the key intermediate objectives in Ger-
many, the Netherlands, France and Ireland and are also consi-
dered important in the United Kingdom and, quite recently, in
Denmark. However, the definition of money stock varies con-
siderably from country to country.
10. The supply of  bank credit  to the private sector is the key
intermediate objective in Denmark. In Italy, Ireland, France,
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, the monetary au-
thorities also make use of this concept, but rather more as a
complementary intermediate objective.
In France and in Italy bank credit i& adopted as an objective
with the principal aim of controlling internal demand. In the
Netherlands and in Denmark, account is also taken as far as
possible of the way in which this objective may affect the over-
all balance of payments outcome.
11.  Global, credit  is the key intermed,iate objective in Belgium
and Italy and a similar notion is used in Denmark. The concept
of global credit differs from one country to another according
to the definition of lenders and borrowers. With regard to the
former, global credit may be defined to include not only that
extended by the banks and other financial intermediaries, but
also finance obtained on the capital market and by borrowing
abroad. As to the borrowers, there is a difference between the
concept used in Denmark and Belgium of companies and
households only, and that in Italy where the Treasury is also included. No C 195/14 Official Journal of the European Communities 15.
Predominant
intermediate objective
Complementary
intermediate objective
Money stock
(1) M1, M2, M3
(2) Central bank money
Bank liquidity
Monetary base
Credit
(1) Bank credit
(2) Global credit
Interest rates
France
Ireland
Netherlands
Germany (FR)
United Kingdom
Denmark
Germany (FR)
Belgium
. Italy
Denmark , France
Ireland
Netherlands
United Kingdom
Italy
Denmark Belgium
Italy
Belgium Italy
United Kingdom
Denmark
12.  Interest rates  represent an important intermediate objec-
tive in Belgium, and also to a lesser degree in the United King-
dom, Italy and Denmark. The rates taken into consideration
may be those ruling on the money market, those ruling on the
capital market or those applied by financial intermediaries. On
the other hand, rates of interest under the direct control of the
central bank are regarded as instruments.
13.  Bank liquidity  constitutes a complementary intermediate
objective in Germany and Belgium. The definition adopted in-
cludes not only free reserves held by the banks with the central
bank, but also assets which the latter is committed to purchase
together with the banks' unconditional lines of credit at the
central bank.
14.  Monetary base  represents a complementary intermediate
objective in Italy. It consists of notes and coin, claims on the
central bank (compulsory and free reserves) and all assets
which can be converted into central bank money at any time.
Monetary base (excluding postal deposits) virtually corres-
ponds to central bank money plus bank liquidity as defined in
Germany.
15. The financial variables treated as intermediate obje~ives
are closely related to each other.
There is for example an interdependence between the level
of interest rates on the one hand and the money stock and
the volume of credit on the other. The monetary au-
thorities may be led to adopt specific measures in order to
diminish such interdependence; thus they may for example,
when restrictive measures are required, resort to credit ceil-
ings in order to limit the rise in interest rates.
There is, equally, interdependence among other inter-
mediate objectives. Manipulation of the monetary base or
of bank liquidity influences market rates of interest and
monetary developments. In the transmission process (the
effect which instruments have on intermediate objectives
and, through them, on final objectives) bank liquidity and
monetary base are closer to the instruments, while money
stock and credit are closer to final objectives.
- A similar comment may be made about the relationship be-
tween bank credit and the money stock. The former is re-
lated to the assets and the latter to the liabilities of the
banking system. The difference between the two mag-
nitudes may nevertheless be considerable if money creation
by the Treasury (for example in the form of postal de-
posits) and by the external sector, or issues or purchases
of bonds by the banks are important. Clearly the difference
between the money stock and the volume of credit is even
more substantial if the notion used is that of global credit, 
16. The reasons for differences in intermediate objectives are
fundamentally the following:
(a) the means of influence and control which existing institu-
tional arrangements make available to the monetary au-
thorities (S 17);
(b) the characteristics of financial intermediation and in par-
ticular the nature and size of financial circuits outside the
banking system (S 18);
(c) the structure and the influence of non-financial sectors (ex-
ternal, public, households and companies) and, in particu-
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(d) the theoretical approach, the traditions of central banks
and practical considerations, for example the availability of
statistics (S 22).
All these factors are at work in each country, but their relative
importance varies. Thus it is generally a number of causes and
only exceptionally a single cause which determines the attitude
of the monetary authorities in the selection of intermediate ob-
jectives. '
Thus, whereas some countries only make minor adjustments to
their intermediate objectives over a period of time, others
adopt a more eclectic approach, having a 'basket' of inter-
mediate objectives and giving them different priorities as cir-
cumstances require. The two ends of this spectrum are rep-
resented by Germany, which has a single intermediate objec-
tive, and the United Kingdom, wher~ the weight placed on dif-
ferent intermediate objectives changes over time.
17. The means of influence and control available to the
monetary authorities in the varibus Community countries de-
pend on a large number of factors. The comparative roles as-
. signed to monetary and financial policy are important in this
respect, as is the extent to which priority is given to a policy
geared to a market economy. Monetary policy instruments will
therefore focus on different aspects depending on the situation
of the country concerned and will be tailored to suit a specific
policy. This situation affects the choice of intermediateobjec-
tives.
18. The structure of a country s financial markets can also in-
fluence the choice of intermediate objectives. If a large part of
financial intermediation takes place on the capital market or
through non-banks, it is more likely that the money stock will
be distorted as a result of substitution between financial assets.
The phenomenon of substitution becomes more important if
there exist financial assets which economic operators regard as
liquid, but which are not included in the definition of the
money stock. On the other hand, it is less substantial if finan-
cial flows are relatively segmented, as is the case in France.
Some countries have resolved the problem by letting liquidity
fall into the background and concentrating instead on credit.
In particular, the choice of global credit as a complementary
objective enables the authorities not to be misled by any distor-
tions arising from substitution between different sources of
credit.
The characteristics of financial intermediation may also lead
the monetary authorities to seek to maintain a certain structure
of interest rates, with the aim in particular of preventing un-
wanted shifts of funds between intermediaries whose rates
interest respond more quickly to market forces and those
whose rates are less flexible.
19. The influence of external factors on a country s choice of
intermediate objectives is positively related to the importance
of its international trade and the degree of openness of its fi-
nancial markets. The most obvious example of external influ-
ence occurs when a country has to adjust its quantitative objec-
tives because the resulting rates of interest provoke undesired
capital movements. In such a case the 'external constraint
(which has been reduced but not eliminated by the system of
floating exchange rates) may lead Member States to base their
actions rather more on interest rates. The constraint depends
on the size of the country, on the level of foreign exchange
reserves, on whether it belongs to the ' snake' and also on
whether its money serves as a reserve currency.
20. The size of the national debt and of the public sector
.deficit may also explain the inclusion of interest rates among
intermediate objectives. For example, the desire to facilitate the
placing of government bonds may lead the monetary au-
thorities to pursue a policy of stabilizing prices on the capital
market. Further, some central banks regard the public sector
deficit (and to a certain extent its monetary fin~ncing) as a
constraint which leads them to base their action more on bank
credit (or on global credit) extended to the private sector.
21. The financial structure of the household and corporate
sectors also has an influence on the choice of intermediate ob-
jectives and on the effectiveness of monetary policy. Thus, the
size of the corporate sector s net financing requirement and
changes in its financing capacity and its indebtedness are
likewise factors influencing the choice of credit as an objective.
22. The choice of intermediate objectives can also be affected
by the theoretical approach, which is often related to specific
knowledge about the transmission process.
Finally, administrative and organizational factors also playa
role. Examples are the ways in which statistics are collected
and processed. 
III. The harmonization of intermediate objectives and their
role in the coordination of monetary policies
23. Harmonization of intermediate monetary objectives
within the Community implies the gradual improvement of
mutual knowledge, which might in turn progressively r~duce
existing differences. Such harmonization can only arise in so
far as a closer coordination of final objectives is achieved and
as progress is made towards monetary integration. At present
forced attempts at harmonization would involve the risk of
reducing the effectiveness of monetary policy in some member
countries. The Council resolution of December 1972, in which
all the Member States were called upon to limit the growth of
, IS an example of premature harmonization; although in
itself this resolution contributed to the fight against inflation
the Member States had difficulty in fulfilling it.
24. The expert group has examined two questions:
how far differences in intermediate objectives represent an
impediment to the coordination of monetary policy, both
at present and in the future;
what possibilities there are of reducing these impediments
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25. On the first question, the working party came to the view
that at the present stage a reduction of differences in inter-
mediate objectives would already be useful because it would
facilitate the work of the Committees concerned with monet-
ary coordination within the Community. However, nothing
would be gained by agreeing on more closely aligned inter-
mediate objectives if this meant that the effectiveness of
monetary policy was reduced in some of the countries. As
further steps are taken towards achieving economic and
monetary union, differences could definitely have a disturbing
effect. Possible ways of reducing them cannot, however, be
looked at in isolation from other efforts towards achieving
economic and monetary union. The choice of intermediate ob-
jectives depends essentially in some cases, as stated above, on
the final objectives pursued. Harmonization of intermediate
objectives therefore cannot be considered in isolation from
harmonization of final objectives and of financial structures.
Moreover, even if such an interrelationship does not exist, the
choice of intermediate objectives is often a reflection, of how
monetary and credit policy is conducted in a given country and
of how its role and its effectiveness are seen.
26. In so far as the second question is concerned, it is obvi-
ously not possible simply to 'transpose' the intermediate objec-
tives of one country into the intermediate objectives . of
another. It is not a question of concepts which can replace each
other, but of taking account of different situations which may
diverge considerably in their development. Consequently, work
towards 'harmonization' of intermediate objectives should ini-
tially be based on enabling individual countries to have a better
understanding of the intermediate objectives of the other coun-
tries by getting each country to analyse its own development in
terms of the intermediate objectives pursued in the other
member countries as well, even where it considers these inter-
mediate objectives would be analytically unsuitable if applied
in its own country. For example, such an exercise would re-
quire country  which applies M2 as its principal intermediate
objective, to compare the trend of that aggregate during a cer-
tain period with the evolution of credit. Similarly country B,
which applies credit as its objective, would observe the trend of
M2. This experience, and further work by the Group, will
make it possible to extend the consensus on the way monetary
and credit policy works and on the advantages and disadvan-
tages of various intermediate objectives.
27. The future work of the Group will concentrate on extend-
ing its mutual understanding of intermediate objeL-tives. It will:
continue the comparison of the evolution of different in-
termediate objectives described in S 26 which has already
been started by the Group, 
start work on the transmission process of monetary policy
on the lines of point 5 of the mandate.
EXPLANA nON OF THE CONCEPTS USED
1. The  final objectives  of monetary policy are the same as
those of general economic policy, i.e. price stability, external
equ.ilibrium, growth and full employment, to the extent that
these can be materially affected by monetary policy. The im-
portance attached to each of these objectives varies as between
countries and according to circumstances.
2.  Intermediate objectives  ~re the financial variables affected
by the instruments of monetary policy. Examples of inter-
mediate objectives are: money supply, credit, bank liquidity
and rates of interest.
3.  Indicators  are variables which make it possible to identify
the direction and measure the ,intensity of monetary policy and
which also permit the authorities to determine whether their
objectives have been achieved. These variables are often inter-
mediate objectives at the same time, but they are then fixed 
ante,  while as indicators they are observed  ex post.  Never-
theless, intermediate objectives and indicators do not necessar-
ily coincide; for example, when an intermediate Qbjective for
bank credit is not attained because demand has been too low
interest rates and bank liquidity become better indicators of
the direction of monetary policy.
4.  Instruments  are the means used by the monetary au-
thorities to achieve. the intermediate objectives which they have
set themselves. Instruments can be classified into direct and in- 
direct. The use of direct instruments (for example credit ceil-
ings and the fixing of minimum levels for banks' lending rates)
may extend to administrative intervention in the economy by
means of regulations. Other instruments, such as rediscount
policy or open-m~rket operations, operate indirectly through
market forces.
5. At this stage the group has restricted itself to giving provi-
sional explanations of coordination and harmonization. The
following are therefore to be taken as merely working con-
cepts.
(a)  Coordination  of the monetary policy of Member States im-
plies the fixing of mutually consistent final objectives, and
examining the instruments used to achieve them. At its pres-
ent stage' of integration, coordination means the joint
development of policies which, while based on different
techniques, can ensure the highest practical state of co-
herence in final objectives.
(b)  Harmonization  means the progressive reduction of the in-
stitutional and conceptual differences which exist between
member countries. Complete harmonization implies the use
of intermediate objectives anp instruments of the same
type.15. 8. 77 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 195/17
ANNEX 
THE EURO -CURRENCY MARKET AND REGULATION OF INTERNA TIQNAL FiNANCIAL
FLOWS
(Report of the Working Party on Short-term Capital Movements to the Monetary Committee and to the
Committee of the Governors of the Central Banks)
Introduction
This report, which is intended for the Monetary Committee
and the Committee of the Governors of the Central Banks, is
part of the working party s work on the regulation of inter-
national financial flows. In accordance with the wishes of the
Monetary Committee, the working party has mainly dealt with
national measures (1) which are liable to exert an influence on
the Euro-currency market and which might be susceptible of
harmonization. Questions concerning ' the Euro-bond market,
banking supervision and intervention by the central banks as
lenders of last reS9rt' remain outside the scope of this examin-
ation.
I. Participation of Member States in the Euro-currency market
In principle, the participation of Member States in the Euro-
currency market may be assessed on the basis of the following
criteria:
use of national currencies on the Euro-curre~cy market;
role on the Euro-currency market of banks established in
the various member countries of the Community;
role of non-banks within the Community as initial sup-
pliers or ultimate recipients of funds generated by or chan-
nelled through the Euro-currency market;
The statistics given below are from the Bank for International
Settlements and are intended to illustrate these three criteria.
They do not reveal the growth of total volume or the shifting
composition of the market over time, as they reflect only the
situation as per end of 197.5. No figures are given for Ireland
and Denmark, which are not members of the Group of Ten and
therefore do not report to the Bank for International Settle-
ments.
1.  Use of national currencies on the Euro-currency market
The following table illustrates the relative share of each cur-
) The Member States' experts have supplied the working party with full infor-
mation, which may be obtained from the secretariat of the Monetary Commit-
tee.
rency in the external foreign currency claims of banks in the
nine European countries reporting to the BIS (2).
(Situation as at 31. 12. 1975) (3)
Currency
in  US 
000 million
US  190'2 73'7
41.6 16.1
15'4 6,0
2.6 1.0
2.1 0,8
:l: Stg 2,0 0,8
Others 4.2 1~6
258.1 100'0
The  US  dollar has always been the most widely used currency
on the Euro-currency market but the DM share has been
growing rapidly over recent years.
For -a given country the share of its national currency in the to-
tal volume of the Euro-currency market is not the only element
determining the extent of the possible impact of that market on
its balance of payments, exchange rate and internal monetary
policy. On the contrary, given 'full convertibility of all Euro-
currencies it is the total volume of the market and its ability to
mobilize funds quickly that is relevant to problems which the
Euro-qurency market might pose for Member States.
2.  The role on the Euro-currency market of banks established
in the various Member States of the Community
. The activities of banks established in the various member
countries of the Community may be assessed in terms of rela-
tive shares or absolute amounts of external liabilities and
(1) As defined by the BI~, the ext~rnal foreign currency position~ of ba~ i!1, t
nine European countnes reporting to the BIS compnse the claIms and ~I~blhtlt:o
of these banks in respect of non-resident banks and non-banks. The positions d?
not include the banks' foreign currency claims and liabilities in respect of resI-
dents of the respective countries,
(3) Latest figures available.No C 195/18 Official Journal of the European Communities 15. 8. 77
claims in foreign currencies of the banks of the nine European
countries (seven member countries of the EEC, two non-mem-
bers) which report to
'. 
the BIS. The following figures include
interbank loans: 76 % of the assets represent claims  vis-a-vis
non-resident banks.
(Situation as at 31. 12. 1975) (1
Liabilities Assets Net position 
US $ '000 US $ '000 US $ '000
million million million
EEC Member States
United Kingdom 128.2 49'6 118.2 45.9 10'0
France 38'1 14'8 39,0 15.2 0'9
Luxembourg (2 23'3 9,0 24'5 9.5 1'2
Netherlands 16.4 6,4 17'3 6.7 0'9
Italy 15'0 5,8 15,0 5.8
Belgium (I 14.5 5'5 14.4 5.5 0'1
Germany 9'3 3,6 10'6 4.1 1'3
on-member countries
Switzerland 12.0 4'6 16'3 6.3 4,3
Sweden 1.8 0,7 2'6 1.0 0'8
258'6 100,0 257'9 100.0
(1) Latest figures available.
(2) The figures for Luxembourg do not include positions in foreign currencies  visa-vis  residents in Belgium and  vice-versa.
This does not fully reflect the volume of Euro-currency trans-
actions carried out by banks established in Switzerland, since
assets and liabilities reported by banks in Switzerland do not
include trustee funds.
Gross positions of banks in Italy which are mostly active in the
interbank market have been sharply contracting since April
1974; in September 1974 the positions were only half of the
amount registered at the beginning of 1974 but they have
recovered remarkably in the last quarter of 1975. By contrast
the gross position of banks in the other European countries
have not increased since April 1974; this applies especially to
banks established in Luxembourg.
This breakdown of the market by country does not correspond
to that of the currencies used on the market: banks in Ger-
many playa minor role compared with the important share of
the mark. The share of banks established in various countries
of the Community in the Euro-currency market would seem to
depend, apart from questions of expertise and tradition, on the
different national regulations concerning monetary policy and
international capital transactions. In addition this share is in-
fluenced by the proportion of foreign trade transactions which
are carried out in national rather than in foreign currencies.
It is to be noted that, as a result of the definition of Euro-cur-
rency transactions, the tables do not show the foreign claims
and liabilities of banks denominated in national currencies.15. 8. 77 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 195/19
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The role of non-banks as initial suppliers or ultimate recipients of funds channelled through the
Eum-currency market
This role can be seen with the help of the following table:
Positions in Euro-claims and Euro-liabilities (1) of non-banks in each of the nine reporting countries
vis-a.-vis  resident banks and  vis-a.-vis  banks of the other European reporting countries at 31 December
1975
Liabilities owed to banks
Non-banks
of the following
countries in the
eight other
countries
resident
(US  000 million)
Claims  on  banks
Net position
vis-ii-vis
banks in 
the nine
reporting
countries
in the nine
reporting
countries
in the
eight ot~er
countries
in the nine
reporting
countries
resident
EEC Member
States
United Kingdom 15.8 1'7 17'5 5,5 0,6 6'1 11.4
Germany 0,8 8,6 9,4 0,5 0,7 1'2 8.2
Italy 1.4 2.9 4'3 0,6 1.2 1'8 2.5
France 2.8 1.0 3,8 0,9 1.2 2'1 1.7
Belgium/ 1'7 0'8 2.5 1'7 0,9 2'6 0,1, Luxembourg
Netherlands 0'6 1.4 2.0 0,9 0,5 1'4 0'6
Non-member
countries
Switzerland 0,9 1'9 2.8 1'8 3,6 5'4 2.6
Sweden 1.3 1'3 0,7 0.1 0'8 0,5
These claims and liabilities are always in foreign currency from the point of view of the bank on which the claim is held or to
which the liability is owed.
This table is a different presentation from table 4 published by the BIS in its bulletin: Euro-currency statistics  fourth quarter
1975 of 29 April 1976.
During the past years the increase in liabilities to banks of the
nine European reporting countries conducting Euro-currency
business has been most pronounced in the case of non-banks in
th~ UK, mainly due to public, sector borrowing in order to
finance deficits of the balance of payments. The liabilities of
German enterprises to the Euro-currency market are remark-
ably high, which can be explained by the fact that they have
exploited an interest rate differential on DM loans due to the
absence of minimum reserve requirements for foreign banks.
Less important is the volume of Euro-credits taken up by
non-banks in Italy and France which are mostly explained by
efforts to cover balance of payments deficits.
Significant differences in the proportion of credits taken up
with resident banks by the non-batiks of the same country can
to some extent be explained by the relative" importance of the
different banking systems in the Euro-currency market.
The amount of Euro-currency claims of non-banks on non-
resident banks is influenced by the extent to which home coun-
, tries permit capital exports within the exchange control regula-
tions. This explains for instance why claims of non-banks in
Switzedand on non-resident banks are several times greater
than claims of non-banks in the UK on non-resident banks.
Euro-claims of non-banks on resident banks are important
only in the UK, in Belgium/Luxembourg and in Switzerland. It
is believed that these claims are generally held by large interna-
tional companies or by their holding companies, as they
periodically have to make large transactions in foreign curren-
cies and prepare themselves in advance for these transactions.No C 195/20 Official Journal of the European Communities is. 8. 77
The Irish and Danish experts have indicated that non-banks in
~ese two countries, while they do not constitute a net source
for funds placed on the Euro-currency market, have often had
recourse to loans on this market on behalf of the public, semi-
public anI;! private sectors.
II. The regulation of international financial flows in the con-
text of the Euro-currency market
1.  Problems for the national economies posed by the exist-
ence of the Euro-currency market. 
The working party looked at the question of whether the exist-
ence of the Euro-currency market posed problems in the man-
agement of economic policies for the monetary authorities in
the Member States. This market, representing the channel
through which a sizeable proportion of international liquidity
is held, may conceivably affect .Member States' economic
policies in two ways:
(a) directly, as a result of capital flo~s between national credit
markets and the Euro-currency market, which may inter-
fere with the manag~ment of domestic monetary policy and
the operation of the exchange market and affect balances
of payments;
(b) indirectly, through the autonomous growth of international
liquidity, increa~ing world demand and inflation.
Given the present state of knowledge characterized by conflict-
ing theories and insufficient empirical evidence, the group did
not consider that it was in a position to offer a significant con-
tribution to the discussion of the latter problem, and therefore
has concentrated its attention on the direct effects.
As the existence of the Euro-currency market is held by many
experts to increase the international liquidity and velocity of
capital, they consider that the Euro-currency market might in-
tensify problems which are associated with international capi-
tal flows in general. Nevertheless, it would not be possible to
determine precisely what proportion of international flows
considered undesirable by the monetary authorities might be
attributed to the Euro-currency market rather than to the con-
ventional foreign currency markets.
The direct effects of capital flows channelled through the
Euro-currency market on the economies of individual member
countries vary over time, and from one country to another, de-
pending on the following factors:
the state of the economy and the balance of payments situ-
ation,
the direction, volatility and size of these flows,
the measures taken by the authorities to restrict or neu-
tralize harmful effects,
the degree of monetary controls over the Euro-currency
markets.
In so far as the Euro-currency market generates or transmits
net inflows (outflows) of capital to (from) the national mar-
kets, these flows could aggravate the problems faced by the
monetary authorities in countries with a balance of payments
surplus (deficit). Also, the liquidity creation or destruction ef-
fect of these inflows or outflows might conflict with the
monetary policy objectives required by the internal economic
situation of countries at the time these flows occur. However
it is held that under no~al conditions, more flexible exchange
rates should tend to reduce somewhat the size and frequency of
speculative capital movements.
The real impact of funds generated by or channelled through
the Euro-currency market on economies of member countries
depends, of course, to a large extent on the willingness and
ability of the authorities to adopt measures to restrict or neu-
tralize these flows and the effectiveness of these measures. In
this respect, the differences between member countries are
quite pronounced. While all member countries subscribe in
general to the greatest possible freedom of capital movements
as an external policy objective, in practice the majority of
countries are inclined to restrict such movements in cases
where internal and/or external policy objectives are felt to jus-
tify such action. This has depended on the circumstances in
which countries have found themselves and the priorities ac-
corded to the different objectives of internal and external
equilibria. Some member countries, on the other hand, have
only reluctantly had recourse to such measures in crisis situa-
tions and on a temporary basis only. The latter category of
member countries is consequently more concerned about the
adverse effects of the Euro-currency market on the effective-
ness of their own monetary policy. They consider overall mea-
sures of monetary control normally to be more appropriate
than direct national interventions in ' the free flow of capital.
Furthermore, the working party considers that, in the light of
past experience, national measures aimed at restricting out- .
flows of capital have generally been more successful than mea-
sures intended to restrict inflows of capital. Some experts have
tried to explain these different results by pointing out that
measures used to control outflows differed from those used to
restrict inflows according to the different sets of national in-
struments and according to national priorities with respect to
direct controls and market-oriented instruments. However
other experts have stressed the fact that domestic funds avail-
able to residents in order to finance outflows are normally
limited under domestic credit regulations compared to interna-
tional capital available to 'non-residents in order to finance in-
flows. The question remains open which of these alternative
explanations fits the empirical evidence better.
The working party recognizes that the effect of capital flows
emanating from or channelled tJ:lrough the Euro-currency mar-
ket depends more on its overall size than its geographical
breakdown or composition by currency. Nevertheless, it was
noted that the existence of a substantial Euro-market in a par-
ticular natidnal currency, as is the case, for example, with the
, may pose particular problems for the effectiveness of that
country s monetary policy. Indeed, German resident non-banks
may borrow in Euro-DM at conditions which  because of15. 8. 77 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 195/21
the absence of minimum reserve requir~ments abroad  are
more favourable for them than at home and without having to
bear the costs of exchange operations and exchange risk cover
which recourse to other ,Euro-currencies would entail. Experi-
ence in Germany has shown that in periods of heavy specula-
tion even direct controls were not enough wholly to prevent
undesired capital movements executed via the Euro-currency
market. This problem does not exist, however, to the same ex-
tent for countties whose currencies are not to the same extent
demanded by the market and which therefore may mor~ effec-
tively use direct controls on borrowing by residents from non-
residents.
2.  The regulation of international financial flows at national
level
The working party examined the question of whether the pres- .
entuse of instruments for regulating international 'financia~
flows by the moneni"ry authorities in" the Member States en-
abled the problems outlined above to be solved or whether these
national measures should be 'incorporated in concerted action
with regard to the Euro-currency market.
A look at the national instruments described in the experts
contributions shows that no Member State has at its disposal
instruments specifically covering net inflows and outflows 
capital emanating from or channelled through the Euro-cur-
rency market. This situatio.D is due to the fact that the net in-
flows and outflows of capital which the monetary authorities
in a Member State may consider undesirable in the light of the
domestic and external monetary situation of the country in
question have a similar effect whether or not these flows are
originating in or channelled through the Euro-currency mar-
ket; in addition, it is not always possible to verify the origin or
destination of international capital flows in applying restric-
tions to capital movements.
It must also be emphasized that all the restrictions on capital
movements in force in the Member States apply indiscrimi-
nately, that is to say without distinguishing between the vari-
ous foreign currencies and between the supplying or receiving
countries. National measures differ as to their purpose and in
the range of instruments used. Whenever countries have been
resorting to controls, their objective has been to protect their
balance of payments and their exchange market and/or to
neutralize undesirable effects on domeStic liquidity.
The working party looked at the question whether, in the light
of the dimension and fluidity of the Euro-currency market, the
national measures in force in the Member States were adequate
to control flows of capital considered to be undesirable. It
found that tn several Member States the monetary authorities
appeared to be fairly satisfied with the effectiveness of their
own national measures, as far as the protection of their dom-
estic markets is concerned.
It was, however, recognized that these national measures might
not prevent undesirable effects on the monetary policy in other
countries. Monetary authorities in most other Member States
felt that their national defences against massive inflows of
foreign capital were not effective enough but that stricter con-
trols were only maintainable with difficulty in the long term
for political and/or practical reasons. The authorities in this
latter category stated that they would like to see monetary con-
trols introduced at Community level relating to the overall
volume of international credit generated by or channel1ed
through the Euro-currency market, through the means of joint
action by the Member States of the Community or a wider
circle. The authorities of other countries thought that such
joint action was not practicable or had doubts, on this score.
Thus, the working party was not in a position to give a
uniform opinion on the opportuneness of joint action by the
Member States to control the Euro-currency market, since
there were differences of opinion as to the actual or potential
effects of this market on Member States' economies and as to
the effectiveness of the national measures at present in force.
However, in order. fully to fulfil the task remitted to it, the
working party has exa~ined from a technical point of view
those instruments which seemed likely to be most suitable for
use in a programme of joint action, were circumstances to arise
in which such ,a programme would be possible.
3.  Instruments for coordinated action on Euro-currency
activities of banks
The working party concentrated on instruments affecting
Euro-currency transactions conducted by banks, but did not
ignore the use of instruments for regulating international fi-
nancial flows transacted by non-banks. It was guided in its
choice by the following particular factors:
is easier for the authorities to control banks than non-
banks, as the number of banks conducting Euro-currency
business is relatively limited compared to the number 
non-banks active on that market;
most transactions on the Euro-currency market pass
through banks established in the Community s financial
centres and subject to the regulations of its monetary
authorities, which differ from country to country;
in most member countries instruments used by national
monetary authorities to limit directly (credit ceilings) or
indirectly (minimum reserves) the supply of credit by the
national banking systems do not generally affect trans-
actions by banks on the Euro-ourency market. This has
permitted some banks to increase the volume of their ex-
ternal transactions, with possibly undesirable effects on
monetary policies within other countries
The introduction of measures to control the activities of banks
established within the Community and dealing with Euro-
currencies could act as a brake on the supply of Euro-credit by
these banks.
The working party wishes to emphasize, however, that banks
established in the financial centres of the Member States do not
have a monopoly on the Euro-currency market and that finan-
cial centres in a number of non-member countries, which by
definition would not be covered by any Community rules and
regulations, could act as substitutes, in part at least, for those
within the Community. If this proved to be the case, the
desired objective, namely control of the expansion in totalNo C 195/2~ Official Journal of the European Communities 15. 8. 77
volume of the Euro-currency market, could not be achiev~d in
full and the main effect could be to shift the centres geographi-
cally at the expense of the Community s financial centres.
. The group considers that joint action restricting only the
supply of Euro-credit$ by banks established in the Community
would be likely to result in a shift of demand by non-bank re-
sidents of the Community if they were free to take up Euro-
credits with banks outside the Community, although there are
different opinions about the magnitude of the shift. In addi-
tion, opinions differ among experts as to the necessity and use-
fulness of restrictions on demand as a complement to restric-
tions on supply if the authorities of Member States should in-
itiate joint action to slow down the growth of the Euro-cur-
rency market.
Most experts feel that restrictions on demand by n~m-bank
residents, either by direct controls or market-oriented instru-
ments, would constitute a necessary and permanent com-
plement to joint action on supply. These restrictions could how-
ever, in the opinion of several experts, increase the cost of pub-
lic sector borrowing in the Euro-currency market, 'at least if
such borrowing were not exempted from restrictions. Other
experts feel that such restrictions should not be permanent and
that they should not disrupt the free flow of capital. They
point out that according to German experience it ha's been very
difficult to influence resident non-bank foreign borrowing
through various measures of capital controls. Problems did e.
arise in the administration of the Bardepot' owing to the diffi-
culty of distinguishing between financial credits and normal
commercial credits, the former only being subject to the Bar-
depo".
(a) The external position of banks
The external positions of banks comprise liabilities to. and
claims on non-residents, denominated in national currencies or
in foreign currencies. Regulations governing these positions
could influence the behaviour of banks on the Euro-currency
market.
In several Member States, the regulations governing the exter-
nal positions of banks are concerned only with the balance of
their claims on and liabilities to non-residents: the control of
net external positions is an effective way of curbing either net
inflows or net outflows of capital via resident banks.
If the introduction or amendment of regulations governing
their net external positions induces banks to reduce their net
debit or credit positions, this may, it is true, also generate an
expaijsion or contraction in the Euro-currency market, on a
scale that would be difficult, however, to predict.
But the restrictions on their net positions leave the banks free
to increase or reduce simultaneously their external claims and
liabilities by corresponding amounts, and this may entail ex-
pansion or contraction of the volume of the Euro-currency
market. Consequently, regulations governing the banks' net
positions would riot be an effective way of controlling the
growth of the Euro-currency market.
The application of rules governing the gross external credit
position of banks established in the Community  vis-a-vis  resi-
dents in the Community, whatever the currency in which such
, lending is denominated, should on the other hand, by imposing
quantitative ceilings, allow a certain degree of control of the
growth of credit granted by Euro-banks established in the.
Community. However, the working party is of the opinion that
such restrictions on external credit involve constraints of such
severity that their use can be justified only to cope with crises
and only as long as such crises last.
(b) Minimum reserves
The supply of Euro-credit by banks established within the
Community could be controlled, indirectly, to some extent if
such banks were required, under a scheme of joint action, to
set up minimum reserves at harmonized, or indeed uniform,
rates on such credit or on their foreign currency deposits,
which are the main source of such credit. Unlike the control of
the external position of banks, which is an administrative
measure, the application' of minimum reserve requirements is a
\(Ileasure in line with market principles, since it would affect the
liquidity and the profit margin of banks doing Euro-currency
business. The profit margin effect would however create an in-
centive to transfer business elsewhere. ,
In order to put such a system into effect, the monetary
authorities in the Member States would need to adopt
harmonized or uniform provisions relating to the following
aspects of implementation:
level of rates;
basis of rates;,
nature of the reserves to be set up.
In addition, arrangements would have to be made for the
institutional management of the system.
The working party wishes to stress the importance of taking
the following considerations into ac-count if such a system were
to be implemented.
If the supply of Euro-credit by banks established within the
Community is made subject to minimum reserve requirements,
it should be decided whether these requirements apply only to
Euro-credit granted to Community residents or also to Euro-
credit granted to residents of non-member countries. In the
first case, banks established within the Community would con-
tinue to supply Euro-credit to residents of non-member coun-
, tries on the same terms as Euro-credit supplied by banks estab-
lished outside the Community, but the impact of joint action
on the total volume of Euro-credit would probably be more
limited.
If deposits made by non-residents o( the Communi~ with
banks established in the Community were exempted from
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Community would be in the same competitive position as
banks outside the Community when bidding for these deposits.
On the other hand, this would increase the potential of banks
in the Community to grant Euro-credits to residents of the
Community.
4.  Additional instruments affecting transactions by resident
non-banks
Although the existence of instruments applying to Euro-trans-
actions by banks established within the Community can reduce
the volume of trans~ctions carried out by such banks with
Community resident non-banks, Community non-banks may, if
exchange controls permit, still be able to resort to banks in
non-member countries (1), which by definition are not covered
by controls on banks within the Community. Consequently,
situations might arise in which it might be necessary to sup-
plement controls relating to the activities of resident banks by
restrictions on Community resident non-banks' deposits or
credits with banks established outside the Community.
The working party does not consider that any such supplemen-
tary measures would from a technical point of view need to be,
identical as to the instruments chosen, provided that their ef-
fect is more or less equivalent from one Member State to
another. Transactions by residents with banks in non-member
countries could be limited, depending on the Member State in
question, either by applying exchange controls, or by recource
to measures in line with market principles (cash deposit system
of the Italian type on exports of capital or 'Bardepot' (cash de- .
posit) of the German type on imports of capital).
III. Differences in national experts' attitudes towards the
Euro-currency market and towards joint action aimed at its
control
The written or oral contributions of national experts concern-
ing problems related to the Euro-currency market as seen from
the capitals .reflect divergent opinions between national
authorities concerning joint action aimed at controlling the
Euro-currency market. Therefore these submissions are sum-
marized below.
(a)  The role of the Euro-currency market in creating or trans-
mitting world inflation and undes~rable capital flows
The group as a whole recognizes that the Euro-currency mar-
ket constitutes a very efficient international money and credit
market. The market has contributed significantly to the inte-
gration of national markets, to developing world trade, to
financ!ng balance of payments deficits and projects in develop-
) The working party is aware of the fact th~t at present the vast majority of banks
transacting Euro-currency business and establIshed outside the Community are
either owned or controlled by banks established in Canada, japan, Switzerland, I
the United States or in the Community. If these non-member states would join 
the Community in initiating action to slow down the growth of the Euro-
currency market the effectiveness of Community measures would be greatly en-
hanced. However, not all experts consider participation  by  non-member coun-
tries a necessary precondition for initiating CommunIty acnon.
ing countries. Particularly since the end of 1973 the market has
played an important role in placing and recycling part of sur-
plus funds of OPEC countries.
However, the Belgian, Dutch, French, German and Italian ex-
. perts draw attention to the fact that the Euro-currency market
might give rise to numerous dangerous developments. They
think that uncontrolled expansion of the Euro-currency mar-
kets increases international capital movements and inter-
national liquidity and thus contributes to worldwide inflation
to aggravation of monetary crises and to lesser efficiency of
national monetary and credit policies.
The Danish experts to a certain extent share these views,
whereas the Irish experts are not highly convinced of the
dangers attributed to the Euro-currency markets.
The British and Luxembo~rg experts, on the contrary, main-
tain that the Euro-currency market does not lead to substantial
credit creation but only to substitution of national credit mar-
kets. Worldwide it does not lead to a net increase in the credit
volume, which implies that the market is not an independent
source for inflation.
(b)  The opportuneness and effectiveness of joint action by the
Member States aimed at monetary control of the Euro-
currency market 
The German, Belgian, French, Italian and Dutch experts put
forward the following considerations:
national measures taken by one member country alone
cannot in the long run neutralize these disruptive effects.
Consequently, these problems can be solved only by joint
action;
joint action by several Member States could, however
weaken the competitive position of banks in these coun-
tries as against banks established in financial centres in
other countries. In order ' to prevent any shifting of the
Euro-currency market centres, joint action should be envis-
aged with respect to a larger controlled. area than the
Community.
In this context, certain experts have suggested that the intro-
duction of the following measures be examined:
minimum reserve requirements in respect of European
banks' liabilities to non-residents in national currency and
in foreign currencies and to residents in foreign currencies
(German and Italian experts);
minimum reserve requirements in respect of loans in
national currency and in foreign currencies granted by
European banks to foreign non-banks in the controlled
area (Dutch experts);
minimum reserve requirements in the form of cash
deposits with the central bank in respect of borrowing
by non-banks established withjn the controlled area from
banks established outside that area (Italian and Dutch ex-
perts);No C 195/24 Official Journal of the European Communities 15. 8. 
joint central bank action in respect of Euro-banks using
conventional monetary policy instruments (French ex-
perts).
The Belgian experts reserved their position on the opportune-
ness and effectiveness of these specific measures. The Irish ex-
perts doubted whether individual or even joint action by the
Member States could provide a satisfactory solution to the
problem of controlling the Euro-currency market, since there
was a danger of market centres shifting towards non-member
countries. Furthermore, in their opinion, the access of non-
banks to this highly flexible and competitive market should not
, be restricted, especially at the present time. In addition, they
see a technical problem in the administration of such controls.
The Danish experts share to some extent the views of the Irish
experts, especially concerning the point that the access of
non-banks to the market should not be restricted at the present
time.
The United Kingdom and Luxembourg experts were against
any joint action with regard to the Euro-currency market. Their
attitude is based on the following arguments:
international control of the growth of the Euro-currency
market, as distinct from international' cooperation in mat-
ters of prudential supervision is neither necessary nor prac-
ticable;
attempts to control the growth of the market, whether
taken at Community level or within a wider area, would
lead to the booking of Euro-currency operations outside
the regulated area unless restrictions could be imposed
worldwide;
a ring fence would be necessary around any regulated area,
and the larger the area the less effective would such a ring
be in practice;
attempts to control one specific channel of international 
finance would lead to the growth of other channels.
In addition, the Luxembourg experts are not in favour of con-
trols which might increase intermediation costs on the Euro-
currency markets, and thus would lessen their efficiency with-
out strengthening reserves and solvency of banks dealing on
these markets. This would especially be the case if minimum
reserve requirements were introduced.
Final remarks
In examining, in conformity with its mandate, instruments
likely to exert influence on the Euro-currency markets, the
working party has focused its attention on the regulation of the
net foreign position of banks and on minimum reserve re-
quirements. However, several experts mentioned other courses
of action, (e.g. open market operations in Euro-currencies by
central banks or agreements between central banks aimed at
limiting currency diversification in the investment of official re-
serves), but these were not examined by the working party.
These and possibly other techniques could be examined at a
later stage if and when it were considered useful.
As far as continui1)g its work on the Euro-currency market is
concerned, the working party feels that, given the differences
of view amon8., the national experts, it w.ould -not b~ appro-
priate for it ' to pursue the swclY of possible joint action
arrangements in the absence  of  further specific instructions
from the Monetary Committee and/or the Committee of Gov-
ernors of the Central Banks.